Divorce--Financial Inability to Meet Maintenance Order--Husband\u27s Default as Affecting Right to a Hearing to Modify Future Installments by Eldred, Marshall P., Jr.
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 50 | Issue 3 Article 4
1962
Divorce--Financial Inability to Meet Maintenance
Order--Husband's Default as Affecting Right to a
Hearing to Modify Future Installments
Marshall P. Eldred Jr.
University of Kentucky
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Family Law Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law
Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Eldred, Marshall P. Jr. (1962) "Divorce--Financial Inability to Meet Maintenance Order--Husband's Default as Affecting Right to a
Hearing to Modify Future Installments," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 50 : Iss. 3 , Article 4.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol50/iss3/4
RECENT CAsES
instead leaves him as free as at common law to refuse service to any
person at his own whim.
The majority opinion of the Court accepted neither of these views,
ignored the Delaware statute, and proceeded to decide the broader
questions of constitutional law set forth in the first part of this com-
ment. It is a policy of the Supreme Court that when a case can be
decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional ques-
tion and the other a question of statutory interpretation, the Court
will decide only the latter. 7 In view of the possibility that Justice
Stewart may have been correct in the interpretation of the state court's
actions, the appropriate procedure would seem to have been to require
the Delaware Supreme Court to state more clearly its construction of
the Delaware statute. This could possibly have resulted in avoidance
of the broader issues determined by the majority opinion in the Burton
case.
Robert Lawson
DiVORCE-FNANCiAL INABILIY TO MEET MAMTn ANCE ORDER-Hus-
BAND'S DEFAULT AS AFFECTING RIGHT TO A HEARING TO MODIFY FuTuRE
INsTALLMENTS-The trial court granted the wife an absolute divorce,
custody of a minor child and maintenance money. The husband filed
for a modification of that part of the judgment relating to mainte-
nance, alleging financial inability. The order over-ruling the motion
provided that the husband, who subsequently defaulted, purge him-
self of contempt by paying arrearages. On appeal, the contention
was that the trial court erred in summarily dismissing the husband's
petition to modify the judgment without first hearing proof of changed
financial conditions. Held: Reversed. Where the husband was not in
contempt of court at the time of filing an amended petition to modify
a maintenance order, although he might have become delinquent
before the hearing was held, he should have been afforded a hearing
with the opportunity to adduce evidence on the question of financial
ability. Knight v. Knight, 841 S.W.2d 59 (Ky. 1960).
The Court in this case recognized the not infrequent need for
revision of decrees and orders issued in divorce proceedings. This
comment, in accordance with the principal case, advocates a rule
allowing a hearing to modify maintenance orders as to future install-
17See Ashwander v. Tennessee Villey Authority, 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
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ments," even where the petitioner is in default at the time his petition
is filed.
An order for maintenance or child support is an open-end judg-
ment. That is, the order is always subject to modification when the
need arises,2 since the court's jurisdiction over the child is a continu-
ing one. Allowance of money for the support of children "is subject
to the control of the chancellor .... ,3 An indication of the right to a
.hearing is found in the court's interpretation of Ky. Rev. Stat.
§ 403.070,4 which provides that after a final judgment a court may
hear evidence of changed conditions and revise maintenance orders,
if necessary. Further indication of such a right is found in an early
Kentucky case which allowed modification without using the statute
as a basis on which to grant the hearing.5 Because it is important to
allow hearings to modify, courts retain divorce cases on the docket, or
if taken off the docket, redocket them for the purpose of changing
orders as to children. 6 Many states have statutes expressly providing
for hearings to modify such orders.
7
In conjunction with the right to have hearings to modify support
orders arises the problem of limitations. Reasonably, a man who was
a petitioner is entitled to a hearing to modify past due installments is
not suggested here. The general rule adopted in the majority of American
jurisdictions places these installments beyond the courts' modifying power be-
cause such installment payments for alimony or maintenance become vested when
due. Annots., 94 A.L.R. 381, 332 (1935), 6 A.L.R.2d 1277, 1284 (1949). The
justification urged for the minorit rule is that suits for maintenance are
equitable and the court has the au ority to apply equitable principles, even as
to past due installments. Franklin v. Franklin, 171 F.2d 12 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
2 Vand. L. Rev. 475 (1949). Kentucky follows the general rule. Whitby v.
Whitby, 306 Ky. 355, 208 S.W.2d 68 (1948).
2 Grounds for modification of maintenance or support orders usually appear
in the form of changed conditions, financially or physically, of the divorced
father, or in the increased financial needs of the child.8 Ball v. Ball, 206 Ky. 532, 267 S.W. 1081 (1925).
4 Knight v. Knight, 341 S.W.2d 59, 60 (Ky. 1960). Ky. Rev. Stat. § 403.070
(1960) [hereinafter cited as KRS] provides:." At any time ... [after final judg-
ment], upon the petition of either parent, the court may revise any of its orders
as to the children, having principally in view in all such cases the interest and
welfare of the children. See Spencer v. Spencer, 312 S.W.2d 360 (Ky. 1958);Betel v. Beutel, 805 Ky. 688, 205 S.W.2d 489 (1947).
It should be noted that KRS 403.070 appears to be directed toward the
jurisdiction of a court, not vesting a right" in the husband to a hearing.
5 Davis' Adm'r v. Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. Ry. Co., 172 Ky. 55, 188 S.W.
1061 (1916).
OMiddleton v. Middleton, 218 Ky. 398, 291 S.W. 359 (1927). Such power
to redocket and modify is not limited to the term at which the judgment is
entered. Hatcher v. Hatcher, 312 Ky. 568, 228 S.W.2d 461 (1950). Even
agreements between the parents concerning maintenance of children which have
been incorporated into the divorce judgment cannot deprive a court of jurisdiction
to modify such a judgment as to children. Bishop v. Bishop, 238 Ky. 702, 38
S.W.2d 657 (1931).
7 See 2 Vernier, American Family Laws § 95, Table LII (1932, Supp. 1938).
Annot., 6 A.L.R.2d 1277, 1288 (1949).
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not in default at the time he filed his petition should be entitled to a
hearing as to future installments notwithstanding any default during
the prolonged pendency of the petition. The decision in the principal
case is limited to this exact situation. But what as to the husband
who was in default at the time of filing the petition for a modification
hearing? This is the question the court in the Knight case attempted
to answer, stating:
In conclusion we summarize (1) that at the time the petition
for modification was filed appellant was not in default and (2) even
if he was in default, he is entitled to produce evidence, if any he has,
to show that he is unable to meet the requirements of the decree.8
Statement (2) is dictum, and with this dictum the court expressly
purported to overrule two earlier Kentucky cases which required one
to purge himself of contempt before being granted a hearing.9 The
first, Campbell v. Campbell,'0 involved a judgment for child support
which the husband did not pay. The divorced mother caused execution
to issue on the judgment and the husband filed a petition seeking an
injunction against the sheriff to prevent levy of execution. In the
Campbell case it was held that a party was in contempt of court in
not complying with its orders and such party was not entitled to be
heard until he should be purged of contempt.." In the second case,
Whitby v. Whitby, the court stated that "the judgment debtor must
pay all past due installments, thus purging himself of contempt, before
the court will entertain a motion to modify the judgment in respect to
future installments." 2 These cases did not squarely meet the issue
facing the court in the principal case. The right to a hearing was, in
both instances, only a collateral issue. The Whitby case can be dis-
tinguished further from the principal case: in the former the husband
was able to meet the judgment and in the latter, the order was
allegedly impossible to meet.
The justification for allowing a hearing to modify is found in the
word "impossible." Default in good faith indicates a need for revision
as to future installments. When a petitioner pleads inability, as did the
husband in the principal case, and such inability is not in bad faith,' 3
8 Kni ght v. Knight 841 S.W.2d 59, 62 (1960).
9 £the parts of the opinions in the Campbell and Whitby cases which
indicate that a party is not entitled to a hearing in court until he has purged
himself of contempt by reason of failure to make installment payments are over-
ruled." Ibid.
10 228 Ky. 836, 4 S.W.2d 1112 (1928).
"1 Id. at 838, 4 S.W.2d at 1113.
'2806 Ky. 355, 357, 208 S.W.2d 68, 69 (1948).
13 "To have purged himself of contempt for his failure to comply with the
court's orders he must have made it clearly appear, not only that he was unable
(Footnote continued on next page)
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the court should recognize the reasonableness in allowing a hearing to
modify. A modification here would arrest the default at an early stage
in the installments, thereby preventing an accumulation of debt
impossible to pay. To require a petitioner to purge himself of con-
tempt is unrealistic when his reason for non-compliance is as valid at
the time of application as it would be at a later date when he had
purged to the satisfaction of the court. A court should grant a hearing
concerning the modification of future installments when the petitioner
pleads inability or impossibility, regardless of the time of default.
There are several courses of action open to the courts: they may
ignore completely the fact that petitioner is in default; they may base
granting the hearing on mere default as opposed to contempt;14 they
may grant a hearing and make relief conditional upon the payment of
past due installments; 15 or they may continue to require purgation. A
court would not abuse its discretionary power if it granted a hearing
concerning the modification of future installments where the petitioner
satisfactorily shows inability to comply with the order.'0 To require
a petitioner to "purge" himself before filing a petition to modify would
in effect hold him in contempt without allowing him the chance to
prove his good faith.'
7
While the court in the Knight case does not hold that the petitioner
is entitled to a hearing without purgation, its utterance by way of
dictum will probably have the same effect.
Marshall P. Eldred, Jr.
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
to comply therewith, but also that his inability was not caused by his own neglect
or misconduct." Hembree v. Hembree, 208 Ky. 658, 271 S.W. 1100, 1101
(1925). See also Roper v. Roper, 242 Ky. 658, 47 S.W.2d 517 (1932).(dictum).
14 Courts could allow a hearing where the petitioner is merely in default
unintentionally, and refuse such where the petitioner has been adjudged in
contempt for intentional failure to pay installments. This method would requira consistent application of the meanings of "default" and "contempt!' to the tcts,
of each case. Annots., 6 A.L.R.2d 835, 837, 845 (1949).
15 This is perhaps the most practical solution. By granting the hearing an
accumulation of debt would be prevented. The conditional nature of the relief
would protect the divorced mother and the child. See Ryerson v. Ryerson, 194
Minn. 350, 260 N.W. 530 (1935), where the court granted modification and
suspended a sentence of contempt on condition that the divorced father would
pay the past due installments. See also Brummer v. Brummer, 6 N.J. Super. 401,
69 A.2d 38 (1949), where the court made reconsideration of the petition to
modify an alimony order conditional upon payment of past due installments.
Annot., 6 A.L.R.2d 835, 839 (1949).
16 "The trial court is vested with broad discretion in matters of this kind
and this Court will not interfere unless that discretion is abused." Somerville v.
Somerville, 339 S.W.2d 940 (Ky. 1960).
17 Williams v. Williams, 12 N.J. Misc. 641, 174 Ad. 423 (1934).
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